



Managing Longevity Risk: Tontines vs. Annuities

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Introduction

Annuity providers face systematic mortality risk:

- ▶ Solvency regulations force insurers to set aside capital
- ▶ Possible consequences: High annuity/reinsurance premiums, solvency risk when capital requirements are not sufficient, . . .

Measures taken:

- ▶ Risk transfer to other parties (e.g. Swaps) or policyholders

Objectives

- ▶ Derive optimal payouts for expected-utility-maximizers
- ▶ Fairness restrictions
- ▶ Analyze risks borne by providers
- ▶ Calculation of risk-adequate loadings (→ Solvency II)
- ▶ Multiple perspectives

Tontines: Past and present

- ▶ Early suggestion by Tonti (17 th century)
- ▶ Collection of money in the UK
- ▶ Popular product in the US - now forbidden
- ▶ Milevsky, Salisbury (2015): Optimal Retirement Tontines

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Relevant quantities

- ▶ Tontine contract:
 - ▶ Provider pays a fixed amount to a group of policyholders
 - ▶ alive policyholders share the payout
- ▶ Annuity contract:
 - ▶ Provider pays a fixed amount to each alive individual

Contract payoffs

At time $t > 0$

- ▶ an individual tontine-policyholder receives

$$b^\bullet(t) := \mathbb{1}_{\{\zeta > t\}} \frac{nd(t)}{N(t)}, \quad (1)$$

- ▶ an annuitant receives

$$b^\circ(t) := \mathbb{1}_{\{\zeta > t\}} c(t). \quad (2)$$

where ζ is the residual lifetime of the individual and $N(t)$ is the number of policyholders at time t .

Value of a tontine

$$\begin{aligned} P^\bullet(\cdot, p_x^*, d(\cdot), n) &:= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-rt} b^\bullet(t) dt \right] \\ &= \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} {}_t p_x^* \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \binom{n-1}{k} ({}_t p_x^*)^k (1 - {}_t p_x^*)^{n-1-k} \frac{nd(t)}{k+1} dt \\ &= \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} (1 - (1 - {}_t p_x^*)^n) d(t) dt. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Value of an annuity

$$P^\circ(\cdot, p_x^*, c(\cdot), n) := \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-rt} b^\circ(t) dt \right] = \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} {}_t p_x^* c(t) dt. \quad (4)$$

Expected utility - Policyholder perspective

Assume an investor with; Power utility with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)

$$u(X) = \frac{X^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

Expected utility of a tontine policyholder:

$$\begin{aligned}
 U^\bullet(\cdot, p_x^*, d(\cdot), n) &:= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty \mathbb{1}_{\{\zeta > t\}} e^{-rt} u\left(\frac{nd(t)}{N(t)}\right) dt \right] \\
 &= \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \binom{n-1}{k} u\left(\frac{nd(t)}{k+1}\right) ({}_t p_x^*)^{k+1} (1 - {}_t p_x^*)^{n-1-k} dt.
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{5}$$

Optimal tontine payout

$$d^*(t) := \max_{d(t)} U^\bullet(\cdot p_x^*, d(\cdot), n), \quad (6)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} d(t) (1 - (1 - {}_t p_x^*)^n) dt \leq 1.$$

Solution:

$$d^*(t) = \left(\frac{\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \binom{n-1}{k} \left(\frac{n}{k+1}\right)^{1-\gamma} ({}_t p_x^*)^{k+1} (1 - {}_t p_x^*)^{n-1-k}}{\lambda^* (1 - (1 - {}_t p_x^*)^n)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}, \quad (7)$$

Optimal annuity payout

$$c^*(t) := \max_{c(t)} U^o(.p_x^*, c(\cdot), n) = \max_{c(t)} \int_0^{\infty} e^{-rt} {}_t p_x^* u(c(t)) dt, \quad (8)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \int_0^{\infty} e^{-rt} c(t) {}_t p_x^* dt \leq 1.$$

Solution:

$$c(t) = \left(\int_0^{\infty} e^{-rt} {}_t p_x^* dt \right)^{-1}. \quad (9)$$

Mortality assumptions

- ▶ Gompertz law
- ▶ Binomial distribution for number of survivors up to time t
- ▶ life tables with mortality shock: ${}_t p_x^{new} = ({}_t p_x)^{1-\epsilon}$, where ϵ is the (random) magnitude of a longevity shock

Risk Margin

Calculation of the risk margin (see e.g. Börger (2010))

- ▶ Solvency II: Technical Provisions = Best Estimate Liabilities + Risk Margin
- ▶ In numerical illustrations: Fair Premium = Technical Provision
- ▶ Risk Margin = $CoC \sum_{t \geq 0} \frac{SCR_t}{(1+r)^t}$
- ▶ Simplifications allowed, e.g. $SCR(t) = \frac{BEL_t}{BEL_0} SCR_0$
- ▶ CoC = 6%
- ▶ $SCR = \operatorname{argmin}_x \left\{ P \left(\frac{BEL_1 - CF_1}{1+r} - BEL_0 > x \right) \leq 0.005 \right\}$

Future losses

At time $t > 0$ the losses generated by a longevity shock can be calculated as

$$L_{\epsilon}^{\circ}(t, \cdot p_X^*, d^*(\cdot)) := \int_t^{\infty} e^{-rs} \left(({}_s p_X^*)^{1-\epsilon} - {}_s p_X^* \right) c^*(s) ds, \quad (10)$$

$$L_{\epsilon}^{\bullet}(t, \cdot p_X^*, c^*(\cdot)) := \int_t^{\infty} e^{-rs} \left((1 - ({}_s p_X^*)^{1-\epsilon})^n - (1 - ({}_s p_X^*))^n \right) d^*(s) ds, \quad (11)$$

Switching from tontine to annuity

Fix a switching time t^* , at time t a policyholder receives:

$$\mathbb{1}_{\{0 \leq \zeta < t^*\}} \frac{nd(t)}{N(t)} + \mathbb{1}_{\{\zeta \geq t^*\}} c, \quad (12)$$

Fair value:

$$\int_0^{t^*} e^{-rt} (1 - (1 - {}_t p_x^*)^n) d(t) dt + e^{-rt^*} {}_{t^*} p_x^* \int_{t^*}^{\infty} e^{-r(t-t^*)} {}_{t-t^*} p_{x+t^*}^* c dt = 1 \quad (13)$$

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Tontine vs Annuity: Loss distribution




Figure: loss distribution: age 65, r=4%

Tontine vs Annuity: Risk margin




Figure: Risk margins: age 65, different longevity shock magnitudes

Annuity: Risk margin




Figure: Risk margin: age 65, various portfolio sizes at inception

Tontine: risk margin




Figure: Risk margin: age 65, various portfolio sizes at inception

Expected utility - risk loading




Figure: Expected utility with risk-based loading: varying interest and shock magnitude

Switching times - Solvency Capital Requirement




Figure: SCR for deferred payout: age 65

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Conclusions

- ▶ Fairness restrictions
- ▶ Products with different risk structures: take into account compensation for risk transfer
- ▶ New products: multiple perspectives have to be analyzed

Outlook/Paper

- ▶ Mortality models
- ▶ Detailed proofs
- ▶ Sensitivity analyses
- ▶ ...

Thank you for your attention!

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Selected references

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